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COMMENTS
ASPECTS OF THE NO-STRIKE CLAUSE IN
LABOR ARBITRATION
From 1932 to the present, the historic purpose of the federal labor
policy has been to attempt a balancing of the power relationship between
labor and management. The economic and legal power was almost totally in the hands of management prior to 1932, while today it is generally
admitted that the weight of influence has shifted to the unions.
Initial efforts to equalize this dynamic relationship began with the enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.' The primary purpose and effect
of the act was to create a laissez faire atmosphere in which organized
labor could engage in bargaining and organizational activities similar in
principle to the free enterprise system afforded business under the common law. 2 This was realized primarily by elimination of the federal equity
power in bargaining and organizational strikes.3 Thus, the Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibited the use of injunctions by federal courts to interfere with labor's use of economic strength through strikes and other
lawfully effective means in disputes with management. Interestingly
enough, section 8 of the act impliedly approves arbitration as a method
of settling disputes. 4 It comprises the first step in the long history of
legislation and stare decisis moving arbitration to the forefront in federal
labor policy. However, this did not manifestly promote collective bargaining, which still retained its common law status, and did not consider
a collective agreement to be an enforceable contract. Under such status,
the terms of the agreement could not be enforced by an individual employee. He could only endeavor to have such terms incorporated into
his own personal contract of hire with the company. Thus, the employee
147 Star. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1958), also known as The Federal Anti-Injunction Act.
2 See S. REP. No. 163, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1932); H.R. REP. No. 669, 72nd Cong.,
1st Sess. 3 (1932).
a47 Star. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1958). "No court of the United States ... shall
have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction
in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute .. "
4 Section 8 prohibits injunctive relief to any plaintiff "who has failed to make every
reasonable effort to settle such dispute either by negotiation or with the aid of any
available governmental machinery of mediation or voluntary arbitration." 47 Stat. 70,
72 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 108 (1958).
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would use the collective agreement as a model for obtaining better terms
in his own contract of hire. 5
In 1935, the passage of the National Labor Relations Act, better known
as the Wagner Act, 6 abolished this common law concept. The principal
result of this legislation was to require an employer to bargain with a
properly selected union.7 Such a union, chosen by a majority of the
workers, became the exclusive bargaining representative for all workers
in the plant, union members or not, and no worker could fix his own
terms of employment since such terms were negotiated only by the union
and the employer. The Wagner Act made no mention of enforcing collective agreements, thereby requiring suit by individual workers as at
common law. With these concepts the NLRA ushered in the era of the
collective bargaining agreement.
In 1947, Congress re-examined the power- relationships created in 1932
and 1935 in the light of the intervening twelve years. This resulted in the
amendments to the Wagner Act contained in The Labor Management
Relations Act, also known as the Taft-Hartley Act.8 This act had a twofold purpose: first, it challenged the prior philosophy of self-help and
freedom of competition for unions by adding restrictions and requirements to union conduct in organizational and bargaining activities. This
was in order to facilitate the removal of certain causes of individual
strife which imposed obstructive burdens on interstate commerce. 9 Second, and most important, it placed equal responsibility on both parties
to the collective bargaining agreement. This was accomplished by section
310 of the Taft-Hartley Act which removed the common law prohibition
of a suit against a union, but allowed federal district courts to hear "suits
for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affec:ing commerce. . .. "10
The most recent labor legislation is The Labor Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act" enacted in 1959. The purpose of this act is to police
5This is illustrated by the following example: A collective bargaining agreement
stated that an employee covered by the agreement was to receive $1.00 an hour. The
employee could not enforce this term, as a part of the collective agreement, but could
only attempt to obtain a $1.50 an hour pay rate in his own personal contract of hire
with the company.
649 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 61 Stat. 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §9 151-68 (1958).
7Section 8(5), 49 Star. 453 (1935), as amended, 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
158(a) (5) (1958).
8 61 Stat. 136-59 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1958).
961 Stat. 136, 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1958).
1061 Stat. 136-59 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1958).
1173 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1960); popularly known as the Landrum-

Griffith Act.
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the internal affairs of labor organizations and to correct certain management-union abuses in the collective bargaining process and the conduct of
2
labor affairs in general.'
Viewing federal labor legislation as a whole, the increasing solicitude
of Congress for protection of the public interest becomes manifest and
it appears that this laudable end can best be attained by collective bargaining, mutually binding agreements and arbitration.
THE NO-STRIKE CLAUSE UNDER BARGAINING AGREEMENTS

The existence of a collective bargaining agreement implies that no work
stoppage will take place while peaceful adjustment procedures are available, and almost every agreement outlines in considerable detail the machinery and the steps to be followed for adjusting disputes and other
grievances. Many contracts contain explicit prohibitions or restrictions
on work stoppages, whether they be strikes or lockouts. Such "no-strike,
no lockout" clauses are designed for extra assurance that the contract
procedure will be used fully before resorting to undesirable practices.
The restrictions on strikes and lockouts provided in agreements range
from outright prohibition of strikes and lockouts during the term of the
agreement'" to clauses covering the protection of company property or
the necessary care of equipment and finished products while a strike is in
progress. Although production interruptions of any kind are frequently
forbidden, many contracts merely limit the conditions or specify the circumstances under which a strike may be called. In most agreements not
specifically calling for automatic arbitration of disputes within the scope
of the agreements, or in those which allow arbitration by mutual consent
only, strikes or lockouts are banned only while the grievance machinery
is in operation or until it has failed to produce a mutually acceptable
solution.' 4 Some clauses, on the other hand, specifically permit work cessation to secure enforcement of an agreement provision or an arbitration
award. 15 Others specify a "cooling off" or definite period of waiting after
strike notice is served.
12The rights of union members are protected from union abuses by title I of the
Act. An outline of the reporting and disclosure rules designed to protect the public
interest and union members from possible union abuses of power constitutes title II.
This title and titles III and IV safeguard union trusteeships, elections, and fiduciary
relationships, respectively.
13 This type of clause is illustrated by the following example: "There shall be no
strikes, lockouts, slowdowns, or other cessation of work . . .nor shall there be any
sympathy strikes, secondary boycotts, or political strikes."
14 An example is: "No strike, work stoppage, or lockout will be caused or sanctioned until grievance negotiations have continued for at least five days at the final
step of the bargaining procedure."
15 A clause that is a typical example is: "During the term of this agreement there
shall be no strikes, slowdowns, picketings, stoppages of work or boycotts by the Union
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No-strike terms sometimes include sitdowns, slow-downs, and any interruption or interference with work, as well as a direct walkout. Picketing and sympathy strikes are sometimes prohibited as well. Moreover,
the union may pledge itself to refrain from officially calling a strike and
not to aid, support, or permit unauthorized strikes by its members. 16
The Labor Management Relations Act allows either the employer or
the union to bring action in a federal district court for damages incurred
by a strike or lockout in violation of the bargaining agreement. Such
judgments against unions are enforceable only against the union as an
organization and not against any individul. member or officer. In determining whether a union is responsible for the acts of its members, the
fact of authorization or ratification is not controlling. Because of this
factor, a wide variety of contract clauses have been utilized for the purpose of limiting union liability for work stoppages. These are usually
one of the following: (1) A clause stating that strikes are not considered
a breach of contract, and the union is absolved of liability for strikes of
any kind; (2) The union is not liable for unauthorized or "wildcat"
7
strikes, provided it takes measures to prevent and terminate such strikes.'
SECTION 301 OF THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT

Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act' 8 states that "suits for violation
of contracts between an employer and a labor organization ...may be

brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of
the parties. . .

."

This provision seems to allow unions to sue employers

for breach of no-strike clauses as well as to allow suits in converse
situations. However, the Westinghouse Case'9 of 1955 demonstrated that
or its members, unless the Employer shall fail to abide by the decision of a duly constituted board of arbitration. There shall be no lockout by the Employer unless members of the Union shall fail to abide by the decision of a duly constituted board of
arbitration."
16 This is exemplified by the following: "The Union shall not directly or indirectly,
assist, encourage, or in any way participate in any unauthorized strike, sitdown, slowdown, or work stoppage during the life of this Agreement. Neither will the Union
condone or ratify or lend support to any unautho:-ized strike, sitdown, slowdown, or

work stoppage."
17 This type is typically worded: "The Company has the right to discipline or discharge anyone guilty of violating the provisions of this Article, but the Union will
not be liable for damages in breach of contract in the event of strikes or work stoppages which the Union has not authorized and as to which the Union has used its best
efforts to prevent and terminate." Here the limitation on liability is coupled with a

measure of union responsibility. Only if the Union takes affirmative steps to prevent
or terminate a wildcat strike will there be no liability on the Union's part.
18 29 U.S.C. S 185 (1958).

19 Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,
348 U.S. 437 (1955).

DE PAUL LAW REVIEW

section 301 could not be used successfully by unions to enforce bargaining contracts. Justice Frankfurter noted that the section was only
procedural and did not create any substantive contract law. In their
concurring opinions the other Justices felt that since the rights created
were uniquely personal rights of the employees, the union could not
enforce them. This presented a dilemma to the workers: they could not
sue to enforce rights under section 301; nor could they benefit if the
union sued in their behalf. Therefore, there was no effective legal remedy available to the employees under section 301.
What the Supreme Court seemed to neglect is precisely what some
authorities20 have emphasized: that both parties may sue in the federal
courts to enforce the collective agreement aside from section 301, under
section 1337 of the Judicial Code 2 1 irrespective of amount or diversity
of citizenship. The Court bases this reasoning upon the fact that these
bargaining contract rights arise in mutually agreements under an act of
Congress regulating commerce.
Then two years later, in 1957, the case of Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills 22 occurred. Here the employers refused to arbitrate grievances concerning the personal rights of the individual workers and the
union sued under section 301. The Supreme Court held that the section
did contain substantive law and enforced the promise to arbitrate. However, this did not overrule the Westinghouse case, for the promise to
arbitrate had only been made to the union, and had not created any
personal rights of the workers. Nevertheless, the Lincoln Mills case forced
employers to litigate grievances arising out of collective bargaining agreements before an arbitrator who was the choice of both parties.
Justice Douglas, in the opinion, interpreted section 301 to mean that
if the whole agreement was enforceable, then each provision would be
too. He stated that section 301(a):
authorizes federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement
of these collective bargaining agreements and includes within that federal law
specific performance of promises to arbitrate grievances .... 23
He went on to say that:
grievance disputes is the quid pro quo for an agreethe agreement to arbitrate
24
ment not to strike.
20 See, e.g., Bunn, Lincoln Mills and the Jurisdiction To Enforce Collective Bargaining Agreements, 43 VA. L. REv. 1247 (1957).
2128 U.S.C. § 1337 (1958).
22 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
231d. at 451.
24 1d. at 455.
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FEDERAL ARBITRATION POLICY

In conjunction with the above, The United States Arbitration Act,2 5
section 2, provides that any arbitration clause in "a contract evidencing
a transaction involving commerce ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable. . . ." Affirmative relief for the enforcement of such agreements

is provided for in section 4.26 There have been diverse interpretations of
section 1, resulting in much confusion with regard to its meaning. The
most confusing part of the section states: "Nothing herein contained shall
apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." Generally, it has been shown that this "contract of employment" portion of
section 1 is a limitation placed upon the entire act.27 But this only applies
when the courts have construed this phrase to include collective bargaining contracts. This view may be found in the case of Gatliff Coal Co. v.
28
Cox.

Ten years later the same Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held,

in the case of Hoover Motor Express Co. v. Teamsters Union,29 that there
were distinguishing characteristics between two situations; that if the dispute involved individual rates of pay, then the statute applied to the
contract; but if there was a dispute involving part of the collective bargaining agreement, such as a no-strike clause, then there was no "contract
of employment" and hence arbitration could then be enforced under the
act.30 Thus, if the Arbitration Act would be interpreted in the manner
of the Hoover Motor Express case, a no-strike clause in a collective bargaining agreement could be enforced under the act. However, it was not
until the Steelworkers Trilogy cases8l that: the scope of and the effect
given to arbitration provisions were determined. These cases established
the rule that the court determines only whether or not the controversy
is arbitrable. The only function of the court then is "confined to ascertaining whether the party seeking arbitration is making a claim which
on its face is governed by the contract."3 2 From these decisions, arbitra25 9 U.S.C. S§§
1-15 (1958).
26 Ibid. See Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HARV. L. REv. 1297
(1954), and 6 LAB. L.J. 58 (1955).
27 Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956).

28 142 F.2d 876 (C.A. 6, 1944).

29 217 F.2d 49 (C.A. 6, 1954).
30 See Cox, supra note 24; Forrester, The Jurisdictionof the FederalCourts in Labor
Disputes, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 114 (1948); Miller & Ryza, Suits By and Against
Labor Organizations Under the N.L.R.A., 1955 U. ILL. L.F. 101.
31 Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); Steelworkers v. American

Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); Steelworkers v. Enterprise W. & C. Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960).
32 Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., supra note 31, at 568.
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tion has become the pre-eminent basis for all federal labor policy.
This, however, presents a problem when a union submits the issue of
breach of a no-strike clause as a grievance subject to the arbitration process. In solving this predicament the majority of federal courts have used
the theory that a strike in breach of a no-strike clause is a repudiation
per se of the contractual agreement to arbitrate.3 3 As a result, according
to this view, a breach of the no-strike clause renders the entire contract
meaningless. A minority of the federal courts8 4 formulate a second theory
that the commonly understood definition of "grievance" does not include
a strike in breach of a no-strike clause. This rationale asserts that "grievances" are merely common-place disagreements occurring in the normal
course of labor-management relations. These matters are considered by
both parties, who mutually institute procedures to settle them. This is
unlike a strike, which violates the entire agreement, including the very
procedure designed to amicably adjust the disagreement. By a third viewpoint that has been proposed,35 there can be no arbitrability of a strike
in breach of a no-strike clause unless the employer has been given a right
by the grievance procedure to file a grievance with the union.
FEDERAL INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AS A MEANS OF ENFORCEMENT OF
THE NO-STRIKE CLAUSE

Once it has been determined that a strike in breach of a no-strike clause
should be discontinued, the question arises as to what are the available procedural methods by which this may be accomplished. There have been
several different answers to this question where an action has been brought
under section 301 of Taft-Hartley for an injunction addressed to a union
in breach of a no-strike clause. The Second Circuit, in A. H. Bull S. S.
Co. v. Seafarers' International Union,8 6 decided that the strike was a
8W. L. Mead Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 129 F. Supp. 313
(D. Mass. 1955) aff'd 230 F.2d 576 (C.A. 1, 1956), petition for cert. dismissed per stipulation, 352 U.S. 802 (1956); United Furniture Workers v. Colonial Hardwood Floor
Co., 168 F.2d 33 (C.A. 4, 1948); United Electrical Workers v. Miller Metal Products,
Inc., 215 F.2d 221 (C.A. 4, 1954); International Union, etc. v. Benton Harbor Malleable
Indus., 42 F.2d 536 (C.A. 6, 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 814 (1957); Cuneo Press, Inc.,
v. Kokomo Paper Handlers' Union No. 34, 235 F.2d 108 (C.A. 7, 1956), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 912 (1956).
34 United Furniture Workers v. Colonial Hardwood Floor Co., supra note 33, at 35;
United Elec. Workers v. Miller Metal Products, Inc., supra note 33, at 233; International
Union, etc. v. Benton Harbor Malleable Industries, supra note 33, at 541; Hoover Motor
Express Co. v. Teamsters Union, 217 F.2d 49, 53 (C.A. 6, 1954); Lodge 12, Int'l Ass'n
Machinists v. Cameron Iron Workers, Inc., 257 F.2d 467, 471 (C.A. 5, 1958), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 880 (1958).
85 Stewart, No-Strike Clauses in the FederalCourts, 59 MICH. L. REv. 673, 700 (1961).
86250 F.2d 326 (C.A. 2, 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958); accord, Baltimore

Contractors v. Carpenters' District Council, 188 F. Supp. 382 (E.D. La. 1960).
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labor dispute within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and
therefore an injunction was not attainable.37 In the case of Teamsters
Union v. Yellow Transit Freight Lines38s the Tenth Circuit said that
the Norris-LaGuardia Act was not applicable since section 301 of the
Taft-Hartley Act granting jurisdiction to federal courts in suits involving
violations of contracts between employers and labor organizations imposed
equal enforceability as to both arbitration and no-strike clauses. Therefore injunctions were obtainable.
It is apparent that the essence of the problem is to reconcile section 301
of the Taft-Hartley Act with section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. In
Trainmen v. Chicago River & I.R. Co.,3 9 the Supreme Court came to the
conclusion that Norris-LaGuardia does not prohibit the issuance of such
an injunction. The Court in its explanation stated: "The Norris-LaGuardia
' 40
Act cannot be read alone in matters dealing with railway labor disputes.
Thus, the problem can be solved. The employee is protected in the free
exercise of economic power in collective bargaining by the Norris-LaGuardia Act, while the results of such collective bargaining are enforceable against each party by the Taft-Hartley Act. The ultimate result of
this accommodation is a pro tanto repeal of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
by section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, thereby preserving the purposes
of both statutes.
However, as with most cases, there is a flaw in the theory elaborated
above. Such a flaw was exposed in the case of Mastro Plastic Corp. v.
NLRB, 41 where there was a strike in breach of a no-strike clause because
of unfair labor practices by the employe. The Court held, in this case,
that a union, when protesting solely against an employer's unfair laborpractice tactics, is privileged to strike des;pite the no-strike clause in the
bargaining agreement. This means, therefore, that when the jurisdiction
of the court is invoked by an employer 1:oenjoin the union's protest of
an unfair labor practice, the judge will refuse to terminate the strike on
the ground that it is not within the proscription of the agreement.
Heretofore, the supposition has been that the collective bargaining
agreement contained both a no-strike clause and an arbitration provision.
But what happens when an agreement contains a no-strike clause, but no
provision for arbitration? This situation has created a predicament because without an arbitration clause the possibility of enjoining a strike
confers a material advantage to management. Therefore the feasibility of
37 As stated in the beginning of this comment, the Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibited
Federal Courts from issuing injunctions restraining unions from conducting a lawful

strike.
38

282 F.2d 349 (C.A. 10, 1960).

89 353 U.S. 30 (1957).

40 1d. at 40.
41

350 U.S. 270 (1956).
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specific enforcement of the no-strike clause at management's request
must be considered along with the solutions there are to this difficulty.
One consideration is that both section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act and
the Norris-LaGuardia Act taken together in conjunction with labor policy
as a whole have as an objective the relative equality between union and
management. In order to maintain this status, where there is now an
alignment of power favoring management, the original doctrine of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act again must prevail and the courts are to be barred
from granting an injunction when there exists no equity to balance the
strength of the parties.
Another suggestion is that the National Labor Relations Board enter
the picture, 42 as an entity to equalize any undue advantage accruing to
labor or management created by a contract containing only a no-strike
clause. However, this suggestion has not been favored by judicial decision.43 Evidently the courts, in refusing to follow the above notion, base
their refusal upon the philosophy favoring freedom of contract. Such
courts feel that no-strike clauses and arbitration provisions are matters
for labor and management to resolve at the bargaining table, and if they
cannot be decided there, then neither the NLRB nor the Court can force
such an agreement.
SUMMARY

It has been noted that the Norris-LaGuardia Act, by prohibiting the
use of injunctions by federal courts to interfere with labor's use of economic strength through strikes and other lawful means in disputes with
management, was the first piece of legislation which demonstrated the
federal labor policy of attempting to balance the power relationship between labor and management. The Wagner Act further exemplified this
policy by ushering in the era of the collective bargaining agreement.
Twelve years later the Wagner Act was amended by the Taft-Hartley
Act, which, in section 301, allowed the employer to bring action in a
federal district court against a union for breach of a no-strike clause.
The Supreme Court has determined that section 301 of the Taft-Hartley
Act contains substantive law and gives the federal courts jurisdiction to
enforce promises to arbitrate against both the union and the employer.
Likewise, under the United States Arbitration Act a no-strike clause in
a collective bargaining agreement may be enforced. However a quandary
arose: How to reconcile section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act with the
42 The manner in which it is suggested the NLRB could enter would be to allow
the union to bring before it the charge alleging a violation, by the employer, of section
8(a) (5) (1958), which requires good faith bargaining by both labor and management.
Hence, the unrelenting insistence by management would be claimed to be bad faith
bargaining.
4a NLRB v. Cummer-Graham Co., 279 F.2d 757 (C.A. 5, 1960).
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Norris-LaGuardia Act so as to have sufficient procedural methods with
which to enforce a discontinuance of the strike. The conflict was solved

by determining that the Norris-LaGuardia Act protected the employee
in the free exercise of economic power in collective bargaining, while
section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act rendered the results of such collec-

tive bargaining enforceable.
CONCLUSION

The foregoing analysis and comparisons emphasize the essential point
that federal labor policy heavily favors arbitration as the means of settling
disputes, and that such arbitration functions efficiently when utilized. It
is obvious that the labor-management re',ationship has undergone many
changes. Perhaps the emphasis today on the no-strike provision and the
arbitration process is just another change in search of the ultimate goal
of industrial peace with social justice.
Today the participants in the labor relations field create the means for
arbitration by private negotiations and contract. The scope of the arbitrator's authority, in fact the very existence of the arbitrator, is subject
to the terms agreed upon by union and management and embodied in
their collective bargaining agreement. However, it is suggested that governmental regulation is necessary when the parties have agreed to limit
their inherent powers of persuasion by the inclusion of arbitration and
no-strike provisions in their contract. Government, as the regulator,
should guide the negotiations to the extent of coercing the parties, once
they agree that one side should be limited, to reach a balance and thus
equalize both sides of the labor power straggle.
There have been several approaches by which the positions of labor
and management can be brought into equilibrium while at the same time
arbitration can be used to settle any disputes that may arise. First, a party
should be able to obtain specific enforcement of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. This, of course, includes compelling both
parties to arbitrate and the use of an injunction against a union's breach
of a no-strike clause. Second, the National Labor Relations Board should
regulate the negotiations between the pa:rties to the extent of forcing
upon both of them a no-strike clause and an arbitration provision once
they have agreed to limit their coercive -powers. However, the NLRB
would not act in such a manner if it found that one of the parties had
agreed to include only one provision in the agreement for tactical reasons. Thus, with such remedies available to both labor and management,
the power relationship between both parties could be balanced, thereby
attaining industrial harmony.
Terence Moore

